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Introduction
For centuries governments implemented trade sanctions as a mechanism to coerce 
the actions and policy of other foreign governments (Huffbauer, Schott, Elliot 1985). The 
sender country employs sanctions to cripple the economy of the targeted country by 
taking over an essential percentage of a countries foreign trade, forcing the target country 
to cave into the sender’s policy demand. In spite of a lengthy history, the United States is 
still undecided as to how and when it should employ its economic arsenal. Questions 
about what causes a successful economic coercion episode and when they should be 
utilized remain unanswered. The 106*^ Congress considered more than 100 legislative 
proposals for the imposition new foreign policy sanctions, and modification or 
termination of existing sanctions episodes (Rennack 1999). In early 2000, the active 
public became involved in the debate about the employment of sanctions. Triggering 
events such as China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
relaxation of Cuban sanctions, and a dilemma caused by a young Cuban refugee 
demanded the public’s attention, and spurred questions about America’s foreign policy 
formation. The granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China, a 
condition for accession and integration into the WTO, drew attention to the disparity 
between the United States’ existing policy of embargo with Cuba and policy of 
engagement and mixed sanctions with China. The disparity and public consternation 
caused some journalists and politicians to call for a policy review, and/or a unified policy 
towards the two rogue nations (Nethercutt 2000 and Rennack1999).
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A unified policy suggests either a policy of economic engagement with limited 
sanctions as in China’s case or like Cuba, an across-the-board economic embargo. 
Political Scientist, Daniel I>rezner asserts examining the level of conflict expectations 
and opportunity cost of a sanctions episode can assess the outcome and implementation 
of a sanctions policy. This paper will evaluate Daniel Drezner’s Conflict Expectations 
Theory by reviewing the existing blanket embargo toward Cuba and the potential of an 
across-the-board sanctions policy placed on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 
results should evidence the outcome of implementing a blanket policy of economic 
coercion in each scenario.
Academic Approaches to Sanctions
In the last twenty years, the United States used sanctions frequently as a central 
tool in her foreign policy arsenal. Between 1992 and 1996 alone, the United States 
imposed or threatened economic sanctions on thirty-five countries, expanding over a 
population equal to approximately 42 percent of the world’s population (Schlesinger 
1997 in Drezner 1999). The current literature presents a confluence of complicated 
factors, sets of conflicted data, and mixed academic opinion leading to the predominate 
conclusion that sanctions while more likely not to work than to work, may under specific 
circumstances achieve limited policy goals.
Economic coercion is defined as the deliberate use of economic leverage to 
influence the policy and action of another country in order to pursue foreign policy goals. 
Sanctions are a type of economic coercion defined as the “deliberate government-inspired
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withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal of customary trade or financial relations” (Hufbauer, 
Schott, Elliot 1985). Sanctions are affected and defined by a multitude of factors. These 
factors include: the length of the sanctions, the disparity between the Gross National 
Products (GNP) of the target and sender, the size of the demand, the stability of the target 
country, who bares the burden within the target country, the goals of the sender country, 
the international cooperation, the ability of the target country to realign, military threat, 
and the domestic politics within the sender and target country.
There are four main academic approaches thought to affect the afore mentioned 
factors which determine sanctions, the necessity of multilateral cooperation, the 
concurrent threat of military action, the role of domestic politics, and the unintentional 
strengthening of sanctioned targets. In addition, political scientist, Daniel Drezner adds a 
new factor to the list of determinants: the expected level of conflict in the relationship 
between the sender and target country. In his recent book. The Sanctions Paradox. Daniel 
Drezner challenges the assumption that sanctions are a failed policy tool. He offers an 
alternative assessment, points out flaws in the existing literature, and offers a competing 
paradigm to discern a sanction’s potential for success.
For sanctions to be successful, the first popular approach suggests sanctions must 
be multilateral (Yeutter 1999). It is estimated ineffective unilateral sanctions cost the 
United States 15-20 billion dollars per year and hinder international relationships (Lash 
1999). Multilateral agreements signal to a target country the gravity of the political 
demand and ensure the paralysis of the market (Gardner and Kimbraugh 1990 in Drezner 
1999). In the imi or multilateral debate, conservatives and liberals generally prefer
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multilateral economic coercion. Conservative political scientists dislike unilateral 
sanctions because of the economic impact, and liberal political scientists dislike unilateral 
economic coercion because of the lack of ally support and amoral outcomes. Drezner 
counters this established viewpoint by showing not only the expense and difficulty of 
multilateral initiation, but also that attributed to failed or nonexistent enforcement 
mechanisms, multilateral sanctions fail to coerce an improved response (Drezner 2000). ‘
The second approach for determining the success of sanctions places the 
importance military statecraft over the importance of economic statecraft. Unilateral and 
sometimes multilateral sanctions serve as a signal for impending military coercion. If 
military or quasi-military action is threatened or instigated along side sanctions, the 
potential for acqm'escence is improved. Case studies such as Iraq’s venture into and 
withdrawal from Kuwait and Haiti’s expulsion of their military ruler exemplify 
purportedly successful sanctions supported by military action. In both cases, economic 
coercion foreshadowed military coercion and led to an acceptance of the demand.
Efrezner argues that while economic coercion may play counterpoint to successful 
military action or threat; it is neither the only, nor the best indicator of sanctions 
implementation or outcome (Drezner 1999). He points to a statistically significant
' Drezner’s assertion is fortified by the extensive 1983 study by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffery 
Schott, and Kimberly Elliot, which demonstrated in comparing um'lateral to sanctions that 
statistically multilateral cooperation has little effect on sanctions’ outcomes (Hufbauer, 
Schott, Elliot 1985,1990).
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number of sanctions whose success is not based on military threat. The numbers show 
sanctions are more likely to be successful when waged against allies who do not face 
military action. This policy misconception may in part come from the fact that most 
studies concentrate on well-publicized sanctions episodes, which are typically those 
between foes and not allies.
A third popular approach for determining the outcome and implementation of 
sanctions focuses on the domestic politics of the sender and target countries. According 
to the domestic politics approach, sanctions are initiated when the populace of the sender 
country wishes to affect change in the policies of the target country, yet feels the cost of 
military intervention is too high. The domestic political costs of inaction are too high and 
foster an impression of weakness. In response, the sender country will implement 
sanctions to posture action even if success is not anticipated. This approach is a popular 
response to human rights violations and religious persecution (Rennack 1999). In these 
scenarios. Sanctions become a symbol, a stagecraft rather than statecraft.
Unlike Drezner, followers of domestic politics theory tend to disparage the use of 
sanctions as a policy tool. They note the inclination of sanctions on rogue states to cause 
a rallying effect in the target populace such as those seen in Rhodesia and Cuba 
(Gaultung 1967 in Drezner 1999 and Peter Schwab 1999). Disparagers of the theory also 
point to target governments who may prefer to be sanctioned because of the rent-seeking 
opportunities and unintentional benefits for elite populations. Sanctions that equally 
affect or specifically target elite populations are viewed as more effective and moral. 
They are more responsible than archetypical “across-the-board- sanctions” currently
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being waged in Cuba and Iraq (Rennack 1999). The theory also concludes the 
implementation and imposition of sanctions will be irregular and not based on solid logic 
or trade data.
Drezner’s rebuttal against the domestic politics theory is unconvincing. He 
centers his refute on the assertion, that for the most part the implementation of sanctions 
is not unpredictable and can be predicted according to his conflict expectation model. He 
agrees sanctions may cause a national esprit de corps and other benefits for the target 
country; yet he fails to make a position on the targeting of elites, thereby in part failing to 
disprove the power of the hypothesis.
Drezner’s Contribution
Drezner’s main addition to the literature is his development of conflict 
expectations as a factor in determining the success of economic coercion. Conflict 
expectations are the amount of future disagreements and dissentions anticipated by the 
sender and target country in future interactions. Daniel Drezner took his conceptual 
framework and hammered it into seven clear hypotheses, chi boxes, decision trees, and 
game theory models to better predict the outcomes and implementations of economic 
coercion. Drezner uses Game Theory to explore the conflict expectations model. Game 
Theory is a modeling tool using an algebraic model of assumptions and variables to 
compare and contrast outcomes with counterfactual possibilities (Drezner 1999). The 
algebraic Game Theory is useful conceptually, but limited in its ability to adapt to the 
wide range of possible responses and half successes. However, the explanatory chi boxes.
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models, and hypothesis are a useful addition to a developing body of sanctions theory 
(See appendix A-E). While, Conflict Expectations Theory is not the only factor 
determining the outcome of sanctions policy, Drezner is able to prove its value as a 
significant new indicator. Using the explanatory power of Drezner’s conflict 
expectations model and concentrating on five of his seven hypotheses, this paper will 
examine the outcomes Drezner’s model predicts for the use of economic coercion in 
Cuba and China.
Daniel Drezner argues both the sender and target countries incorporate the 
expectation for future conflict, along with short-run opportunity costs into their behavior 
determinants. If countries are allies with a low expectation of future conflict, the sender is 
less likely to impose sanctions and more likely to prefer the status quo. If the countries 
are enemies with a high expectation of future conflict the sender is more likely to use 
economic coercion to propel change (Drezner 1999). However, this is where the paradox 
occurs. Even though allies are less likely to use economic coercion, sanctions against 
allies are more likely to result in larger concessions, and conversely, sanctions against 
non-allies are more likely to end in deadlock or insignificant concessions (See Appendix 
A). For example, during the Carter presidency, sanctions were issued against human 
rights abusers. Sanctions were placed on both Ethiopia, who perceived a high potential 
for conflict, and Brazil, who held lower conflict expectations with the United States. As a 
result, Ethiopia realigned with the Soviet Union and offered no concessions, whereas 
Brazil began releasing political prisoners (Drezner 1999 and Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 
1985).
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Figure 1. Chi box: Drezner’s Conflict Expectations Theory and gap in opportunity cost.
Along with his Conflict Expectation Theory, Drezner outlines seven hypotheses 
for determining sanctions’ outcome (See Appendix B). These are drawn from his work as 
well as the case studies and work of other political scientists. His hypotheses are as 
follows:
Hypothesis 1; No coercion event should generate greater opportunity costs 
for the sender than the target country.
Hypothesis 2: Within the set of coercion events, the alignment between 
target and sender should be negatively correlated with the cost to sender, but 
positively correlated with the cost to target.
Hypothesis 3: The target’s concessions will increase when the difference 
between the target’s and sender’s opportunity costs of deadlock increases.
Hypothesis 4: The target’s concession will increase when target and sender 
are more closely aligned with each other.
Hypothesis 5: If the target realigns against the sender during the coercion 
dispute, the target’s concession will be smaller.
Hypothesis 6: Sanctions will be imposed for a longer duration when the two 
countries are adversaries.
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Hypothesis 7: If the sender is observed offering a carrot to an adversarial 
target, the following is likely to be observed: A) The demand is non- 
negotiable. B) The carrot is very lucrative for the target. C) The carrot is 
virtuously costless for the sender. (Drezner 1999)
Concentrating on Drezner’s first five hypotheses, one should be able to insert case
studies, such as sanctions against China and Cuba to predict a plausible sanctions
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outcome and prove the utility of Drezner’s theory.
Explanation of Data
Drezner’s seven hypotheses are based on two factors: assessed opportunity costs 
and alignment or conflict expectations. Drezner notes the continuing relevance of several 
other previously mentioned determinants such as domestic politics and military threat. He 
sees however, opportunity cost and alignment as holding greater explanatory power. To 
simplify the application of his hypotheses to China and Cuba this paper will assume the 
sanctions are applied “across-the-board”.
The opportunity cost will be assessed using the 1999 GNP trade data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division. The cost to sender will be considered the 
same as opportunity cost. TTie Pentagon’s Security Threat list and general state of current 
and historic U.S. and target relations will determine alignment (Carpenter 1999, Pregelj 
1999, Sullivan, 1999). By these estimations, neither China nor Cuba are considered allies, 
and China is considered more of a threat than Cuba.
* This paper will concentrate on Drezner’s first five hypotheses as they are specifically pertinent to die 
Cuban and Chinese economic coercion episodes, are the more influential in determining implementation 
and outcome, as well as being better developed by Drezner.
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US Sanctions against China: Applying Drezner’s model
The People’s Republic of China and the United States of America have a 
historically contentious relationship. In the last year alone there were allegations of 
intelligence espionage, trade dumping, human rights violations, questionable military 
maneuvers, and illegal campaign contributions (Rennack 1999). The US-Chinese 
relationship is complex. While the United States caimot condone human rights violations 
and trade barriers, neither can it afford to close the door to the world’s most populous 
country. According to official Chinese figures, its Gross Domestic Product is $4.42 
trillion and is expanding at an amazing 7.8% annually (CIA World Fact Book 1999).
The Um'ted States currently maintains six specific laws triggering sanctions 
against the Peoples Republic of China, independent of the general varieties of 
international sanctions, which can be imposed for everything from human rights 
violations to unpaid parking tickets (Rennack and Shuey 1999). Currently most of the 
sanctions against the PRC are waved with the exception of a few sectional sanctions in 
areas such as satellite exports (Rennack and Shuey 1999). Most recently, the decision to 
ignore pleadings to impose sanctions for use of prison labor and human rights abuses was 
over ruled in the granting of PNTR for China. The Um’ted States opted for a policy of 
engagement.
By Daniel Drezner’s account, the decision to retain the status quo policy of 
engagement follows the behavior pjattem predicted by his economic coercion decision 
tree and seven sanctions outcome hypotheses (See Appendix C). Reviewing the plausible
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Drezner’s second hypothesis relates the alignment of the target and sender 
country to the size of the opportunity cost. E>rezner suggests within a set of coercion 
events, the alignment between target and sender should be “negatively correlated with the 
cost to sender, but positively correlated with the cost to target” (Drezner 1999). In other 
words, if the target is an ally, it is likely the sender will only initiate sanctions if the 
opportunity cost to the sender is low and the opportunity cost to the target is high. If the 
countries are allies, the gap in opportunity cost of deadlock must be large enough so the 
target will prefer concession to deadlock.
Since, China is not considered a U.S. ally, the sender (the U.S.) is not as 
concerned about the opportunity costs of deadlock if the target is not an ally, and it is 
more likely the sender will consider imposing sanctions. At this point the sender must 
decide at what point the opportunity costs for deadlock are preferable to the opportunity 
costs of the status quo. Referring to hypothesis number one and Drezner’s decision tree it 
is likely the United States will prefer the status quo to a trillion dollar deadlock 
opportunity cost (see appendix D).
Drezner’s third hypothesis predicts concessions will increase when the difference 
between the target’s and sender’s opportunity costs of deadlock increases (Drezner 1999). 
As determined by hypothesis number one, both China and the Um'ted States face high 
opportunity cost for deadlock. China’s costs of U.S.-PRC deadlock also include the loss 
of access to technology and world markets. Together, both countries face the loss of 
trillions of dollars in trade and opportunity. Therefore, it is likely in the case of economic 
coercion that if concessions were made, they would be small to insignificant. The large
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concession, which is desired by blanket embargoes, is highly unlikely to be met in this 
situation.
Drezner’s fourth hypothesis states, “a target’s concession will increase when the 
target and sender are more closely aligned with each other” (Drezner 1999). If the 
decision to imply sanctions was made and demands were issued, the size of the potential 
concession would be linked to the relationship between the target and sender. Using the 
China scenario, the U.S. and China are considered nonaligned countries. Therefore, 
according to Drezner’s hypothesis, the likelihood of sweeping concessions can be 
dismissed.
His fifth hypothesis predicts if “the target realigns against the sender during the 
coercion dispute, the target’s concession will be smaller” (Drezner 1999). The PRC’s 
current top import partner is Japan, importing 21 percent compared to the U.S. imports of 
only 12 percent. China exports 21 percent to the U.S. and Hong Kong followed by 14 
percent to Japan (US Census Bureau 1999). China’s market is fairly diversified. While 
their export market is heavily dependent on access to U.S. markets, the PRC does 
maintain a multilateral trade economy. It is likely the PRC would be able to gamer 
support from regional, ideological, and economic allies. China’s large economy gives it 
greater potential for realignment, which would decrease the potential size and 
significance of any concession made in response to the imposition of serious sanctions^.
^ In December if 1979, the United States place a grain embargo on the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.). The United 
States sequestered the support of other grain exporters. The agreement lasted two weeks. In 1980, the 
Soviet Union imported a record amount of wheat, albeit at a higher cost and less than predicted, but at 
minimal opportunity cost to the U.S.S.R. U.S. wheat fiumers were hurt and the economic impact hit the 
U.S.. The U.S. was originally willing to take the high opportunity cost because of high conflict expectations
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Reviewing the outcome of Drezner’s first five hypotheses and decision tree 
demonstrates the potential for across-the-board sanctions against the People Republic of 
China to result in deadlock. Across-the-board sanctions are typically linked to a 
significant policy demand Focusing events such as Tiennamin Square, on going human 
rights violations such as the disappearance of Falun Gong members, and military build up 
in the Taiwan strait could all trigger larger demands. However, the adversarial nature of 
U.S.-China relations considerably reduces the potential for significant concessions, thus 
almost assuredly leading to deadlock. The risk of deadlock, coupled with high 
opportum’ty costs for both countries, would force the United States to seriously weigh the 
opportunity cost of deadlock with the opportunity cost of remaining in the status quo, and 
against the opportunity cost for a chance at success.
The success of sanctions depends in part on the goals of the sender. Sanctions 
may either compel a change in policy (i.e. U.S.- South African sanctions to end apartide), 
or seek to generally destabilize a country (i.e. U.S.- Iraq Sanctions) (Dashti-Gibson,
Davis, RadcliflT 1997). Across-the-board sanctions are typically chosen for the second 
purpose. The success of destabilizing sanctions is linked primarily to the targets initial 
stability (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997). TTie chaos caused by the 
destabilization of the world’s most populace country would pose a much greater security 
risk for the United States and the globe than do the current human rights and trade 
violations.
for the opportunity to harm the USSR. The countries ability to realign and the lack of multilateral 
enforcement mechanism caused the policy to fail (Drezner 1999).
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According to I>rezner’s hypotheses, with a large specific demand, across -the- 
board sanctions would be unlikely to work, leaving the United States in a costly, 
inefficient deadlock. A destabilization attempt, coupled with unrealistic demands, is also 
unlikely to work; perchance it achieved success, it would likely cause problems more 
egregious than the current status quo. In the face of contentious U.S.- China relations, 
using Drezner’s model, blanket sanctions face little hope as a successful China foreign 
policy tool.
U.S. Sanctions against Cuba: Applying Drezner’s Model
The United States and Cuba also have a historically contentious relationship. In 
the aftermath of Castro’s socialist revolution, in 1960 the United States dropped a blanket 
embargo over the Cuban economy. In the forty years of embargo, the policy underwent 
alternating phases of relaxation and tightening (Kaplowitz 1998). 1999 saw the first 
major slackening of the U.S. Cuban embargo since the introduction of the restrictive 
Helms-Burton Law in 1996. Pressure in Congress forced the exemption of food and 
medical supplies for humanitarian and economic purposes (Cubanews 1999). Concern 
about the effectiveness and validity of the Cuban embargo was highlighted in the press in 
early 2000 due to the media coverage surrounding a young Cuban refugee (Sweig 1999). 
Academics, politicians, and citizen groups are publicly reconsidering the functionality of 
the Cuban embargo (Schwab 1999, Nethercutt 1999). However, the vehement Cuban- 
American lobby continues to flex its powerful opposition against relaxation. In
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The international commum'ty does not support the unilateral U.S. embargo. The 
UN votes annually 157 in favor, two opposed (Israel, United States), with 12 abstentions 
to end the U.S. embargo of Cuba (United Nations online). International and domestic 
criticism claims the embargo actually supports Castro’s regime by creating a scapegoat 
for the intense economic distress Cuba has endured since the withdrawal of Russian 
support in 1990 (Schwab 1999).
The hemispheric proximity of the two countries and the recovering post cold-war 
relations further complicate and confuse U.S - Cuban relations. As policy makers look for 
new ways to approach Cuba, and continue to assess the current policy it is useful to 
preemptively look down the road to predict where policy might lead. The application of 
Drezner’s hypotheses provide a prediction for the future potential of Cuban sanctions, as 
well as provide an example of a well-known case study in which the outcome of his 
model can be historically reviewed.
Drezner’s first hypothesis looks at the opportunity costs for the sender and target
countries. Because of the pre-existing embargo, the current statistics for 1999 do not
represent the extent of the opportunity costs for Cuba nor the United States. A target is
considered particularly vulnerable to sanction if:
1) The sender country controls a particularly important commodity for the 
target nation; 2) the sender nation imports a large percentage of the 
target’s important export; 3) the target is dependant on foreign export 
items; and 4) if the target economy is highly dependent of foreign trade 
(Kaplowitz 1998).
opposition, the business sector maintains its position that the politically ineffective and
economically detrimental embargo must be terminated.
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All of these situations describe Cuba’s pre-embargo economy in 1958 at the starting line 
for the U.S. Sanctions. The United States controlled over the 25 percent of the economy 
required for a successful sanctions episode (Kaplowitz 1998). Cuba imported 69 percent 
of its monbcrop, sugar to the U.S., surpassing the required threshold of 50 percent control 
for a homogenous good (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot 1990). It also commanded 90 percent of 
the utilities, provided 60-65 percent of imports, and boasted a Cuban-U.S. trade deficit of 
$374 million in 1958 (Kaplowitz 1998). According to E>rezner’s hypothesis, the target 
must and will shoulder significantly higher opportunity costs than the sender county.
In 1999, the ratio between the GNP of Cuba and the United States continues to be 
such that the opportunity cost of embargo rests most heavily on Cuba. However, the 
trade percentages have changed. Cuba now trades most heavily with other Latin 
American countries, as well as Japan and Canada (Statistical Abstract of Latin America 
1998). In spite of the realignment and international support, in the coercion game, the 
cost of the embargo is still estimated to generate greater opportunity costs for the target. 
Following the economic coercion decision tree, this situation would advance the sender 
to consider demand size.
Considering Drezner’s second hypothesis concerning the alignment between the 
sender and the target, it is obvious Cuba and the United States are not allies. Therefore it 
can be assumed the sender would be willing to impose a more costly embargo. The 
decision would run the sender country down the larger demand size side of the decision
17
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tree/ The sender’s willingness to impose sanctions under a heavy demand follows 
Drezner’s expectations.
Drezner’s third hypothesis initially fails to function. At the outset, the opportunity 
cost between the two countries is significant and should lead to concession rather than 
deadlock. Contrary to the theory’s predictions, we are looking back at 40 years of 
deadlock with very minimal concessions. This is not a fault in the theory; rather it is tied 
to Drezner’s fourth and fifth hypotheses.
The fourth hypothesis assumes the concession will increase when the target and 
sender are more closely aligned with each other. The contentious relationship between 
the United States and Cuba was emblematic of the Cold War struggles. The mentality of 
them and us ran deep. The Cuban government continues to demonize the United States, 
and the United States continues to treat Cuba as a first class enemy perpetuating the roles 
and reactions of foes.^ The entrenched mentality causes both sides to take stances 
leading directly to deadlock.
The deadlock between the two nations was only possible because Cuba was able 
to realign its economy and country with the Soviet Union. The realignment was essential 
to prevent the complete collapse of the Cuban economy and people. Drezner predicts the
^ Kaplowitz, identifies “six major foreign policy goals of the Cuban embargo, overthrowing Castro, 
retaliation for nationalization of U.S. property, containment of the Cuban Revolution, breaking of Soviet- 
Cuban ties, demonstration of U.S. opposition, and changing the internal situation in Cuba” (Kaplowitz 
1998).
’ The Pentagon no longer views Cuba as a military threat to the United States. In spite of this fact, the 
United States maintains a fierce embargo and anti-Cuban or Castro stance (Pope 1999).
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target’s concession will be smaller when a target realigns against the sender during the 
coercion dispute.
In 1990, the Soviet Union collapsed and withdrew its five billion dollars of annual 
financial support firom Cuba (Toricelli, Bergsten 1998). The Cuban economy atrophied 
rapidly without the significant Soviet support. This development delighted U.S. 
policymakers. Senator Toricelli (D- NJ), a supporter of Cuban Sanctions, recognizes the 
de-alignment as important to the success of U.S. sanctions. He continues to support 
blanket sanctions for Cuba. The Senator notes the full embargo is relatively new because 
until 1993, U.S. firms were still allowed to trade with Cuba. He states, in the next four 
years the Cuban economy shrank by a third, yet four years is just a beginning, and not 
long enough to reach success (Toricelli, Bergsten 1998).
What Senator Toricelli predicts is a reversal of the outcome of hypothesis four, 
leading to larger concessions. However, he forgets two vital factors. The first is that the 
sanctions against Cuba are not only uni-lateral, but they are opposed by most other 
industrial nations. Cuba may have limited trade with the United States, but Cuba has a 
rich trade relationship with Spain, Canada, and Mexico, as well as many other Latin 
American countries (Wilkie 1999). It is not an ideological alignment, but an economic 
alignment. Cuba’s international trade is far from substituting the 5 billion in aid fi’om the 
Soviet Union, however it does offset some of the embargo’s impact.
The Senator’s second omission is his failure to consider the relationship between 
the sender and target country. Tighter sanctions did not improve the relationship between 
Cuba and the United States. In fact, academic consensus agrees, Cuban sanctions actually
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bolster Fidel Castro (Gaining 1967 in Dashti-Gibson, Davis, Radcliff 1997, Schwab 
1999, Kaplowitz 1998). Reportedly in Cuba the 1996 Helms-Burton Law is commonly 
referred to as the Helms-Burton-Castro Law (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997). 
The sanctions only continue to fortify the impression of higher conflict expectations. 
Thereby, according to Drezner, reducing the likeliness of larger concessions.
Appl3dng both the hypotheses and economic coercion decision tree, the United 
States would be economically expected to apply sanctions, and relationally expected to 
stall at deadlock in a sanctions standstill. Drezner’s model predicts the actual outcome. 
However, knowing the inhibited potential of the current course, it may be in the best 
interest of those involved to re-estimate the policy’s opportunity costs. In reconsidering, 
U.S. foreign policymakers should consider the cost of ally relations, as well as examine 
the potential benefits of alternative approaches such as offering carrots or promoting a 
policy of engagement.
China and Cuba: Applying Drezner’s Model
Drezner’s seven hypotheses generally are able to predict the outcome and 
implementation of sanctions in the cases of Cuba and China. Neither sanctions episode 
leads to a particularly successful outcome, and both lead to distinct outcomes. China 
remains in status quo and Cuba stalls in deadlock. The model also demonstrates the 
tremendous opportunity cost and poor outcome involved in electing to nail an across-the- 
board sanctions policy on China.
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The variance in the outcomes of the two scenarios highlights another dilemma: 
the difficulty of applying a single policy to two distinctly different countries. The PRC 
and Cuba may share state-run-businesses and distaste for U.S. hegemony, but the 
similarities do not go much further. Size, location, economy, culture, and reason for U.S. 
sanctions separate the PRC from Cuba. It is appropriate to apply some generalizations to 
both situations (i.e. across-the-board sanctions may be ineffective) however; it is 
impractical to look for one overarching policy to reprimand all U.S. foreign policy 
offenders.
Drezner’s model for predicting the outcome of sanctions’ episodes is useful, but it 
is not a panacea. In his book, Drezner initially concentrates on developing a game theory 
to predict outcomes and implementations. Unfortunately, the actors in sanctions episodes 
are not rational numbers and equations; they are people and states. The game theory is 
useful as an explanatory tool, but in actual utility it amounts to what critic David 
Williams calls, “physics envy”. In fact, after introducing it conceptually, Drezner 
abandons his own game theory in favor of traditional case studies and methods.
Drezner’s economic coercion model is also slightly oversimplified. It is not the 
Holy Grail of sanctions theory, and cannot explain all outcomes or implementations of 
economic coercion. He underdevelopes the utility of “conditional engagement”, and too 
quickly dismisses or fails to incorporate the validity of other indicators such as the 
domestic politics theory and the symbolic role of sanctions. Drezner recognizes this fault, 
but does little to rectify it.
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To his decision tree he eventually adds the possibility of offering carrots or trade­
offs for policy concessions. Drezner does not develop this new limb fully, nor does he 
demonstrate how it fits in with conflict expectations or gap in opportum'ty costs (See 
App)endix G). Megan O’Sullivan suggests “conditional engagement” or the use of 
incentives alongside other foreign policy tools offer a possible alternative to ineffective 
punitive measures against “rogue” states (O’Sullivan 2000). More research is needed in 
this area to examine how conditional engagement functions as economic coercion.
Drezner critiqued other economic coercion theorists for their selection of case 
studies (Dreznerl999,2000). Traditionally, studies have centered on cases where the 
sanctions are between countries with high conflict expectations and often have a high 
public profile. The attention in limelighted cases may cause outcome and implementation 
anomalies and ignore valuable information in absent case studies (Drezner 1999). 
Unfortunately, this paper fell into the same traditional pattern of selecting two unusually 
high profile cases with high conflict expectations.
In spite of the cases’ celebrity, recent developments in Chinese and Cuban U.S. 
relations in part substantiate Drezner’s predictions. Drezner’s model predicts the potential 
for small concessions from China and moderate concessions from Cuba, assuming the 
United States elects to make a demand and the target elects to respond. China’s accession 
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Figure 2. Drezner’s Conflict Expectations Theory and gap in opportunity cost with China and Cuba
China’s accession into the WTO signaled the U.S. decision to forego the yearly 
debate about implementing across-the-board economic coercion. In return, China is 
forced to meet the transparency and economic standards required by the WTO charter. 
The United States and China understood the opportunity costs of non-cooperation and 
elected to both consent to minor changes (See Appendix B hypothesis 7). This follows 
Drezner’s prediction of small concessions and rejection of costly sanctions.
According to Drezner’s model Cuba should offer moderate concessions. Since 
1997, moderate concessions have been made. Small-scale market liberalization and 
migration agreements have taken place (Schwab 1999). This is not to say Castro and his 
government are folding under the embargo. In fact, Cuba persists to be unreceptive to 
considering the demands associated with the embargo. Measures of diplomacy and 
conditional engagement seem to be more productive for U.S.- Cuban foreign policy 
(Sullivan 1999, Schwab 1999).
I>rezner wants to demonstrate and does demonstrate how sanctions can be an 
effective policy tool under the correct circumstance. By the same hand, he shows there 











invites a discussion of when alternative policy approaches such as economic and 
conditional engagement, and traditional diplomacy may be more effective.
The success of sanctions episodes is estimated to be around 50 percent (Drezner 
2000). This also indicates a failure rate of 50 percent The sad statistics from Iraq about 
the human cost of across-the-board sanctions, and the seeming 40-year failure of 
embargo against Cuba justify the public and political call for policy reassessment. One 
benefit of studies such as Drezner’s offer is the ability to hone the use of sanctions as a 
policy tool. This should predictably lead to a more targeted use of sanctions. Cases such 
as China and Cuba’s can be assessed statistically, rather than measured on a populanty 
thermometer. They can also be better manipulated to force targeted policy changes, or 
honestly admit to a goal of destabilization.
Drezner’s Conflict Expectations and opportunity cost analysis should be added to 
the growing body of sanctions outcome indicators. While they may not be a crystal ball, 
using the Chinese and Cuban scenarios conjectures plausible and realistic effects. 
Conflict expectations coupled with opportunity cost prove to be logical and functional 
indicators to predict the outcome of economic coercion episodes.
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